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This essay reviews some of the problems that face biolinguistics if it is to 
someday succeed in understanding human language from a biological and 
evolutionary viewpoint. Although numerous sociological problems impede 
progress at present, these are ultimately soluble. The greater challenges 
include delineating the computational mechanisms that underlie different 
aspects of language competence, as implemented in the brain, and under-
standing the epigenetic processes by which they arise. The ultimate chal-
lenge will be to develop a theory of meaning incorporating non-linguistic 
conceptual representations, as they exist in the mind of a dog or chimpan-
zee, which requires extensions of information theory incorporating context-
dependence and relevance. Each of these problems is daunting alone; to-
gether they make understanding the biology of language one of the most 
challenging sets of problems in modern science. 
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Prolegomena (from Greek, plural noun, singular prolegomenon) — a preliminary 
discourse, statement or essay prefixed to a book, etc. 
 
In the first years of the new millennium, the word ‘biolinguistics’ has rather 
suddenly come into use as an umbrella term for various biological approaches to 
the study of human language. At least three recent books have ‘biolinguistics’ in 
the title (Givón 2002, Jenkins 2000, 2004), the journal Biolinguistics was founded 
(www.biolinguistics.eu), and the first Laboratory of Biolinguistics (Riken Brain 
Science Institute, Japan) is producing its first generation of PhD students. Based 
simply on the divergent contents of the books mentioned above, this nascent field 
is broad in its interests and incorporates diverse viewpoints, both about what 
language is and how it should be studied. Despite numerous disagreements, 
what the scholars embracing this term all have in common is the core belief that 
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the human capacity to acquire and use language is an aspect of human biology, 
and that it can thus be profitably studied from a biological perspective. While this 
core assumption of biolinguistics is not particularly new (Chomsky 1965, Darwin 
1871, Lenneberg 1967, Lieberman 1975), it appears to be an idea whose time has 
come. Biolinguistics is not yet a science — it is more a loosely-defined collection 
of questions and approaches — but it certainly has the potential to become a 
science. The purpose of the current article is to survey this potential, and to 
highlight some problems that stand in the way. 
 
 
2. The Promise of Biolinguistics and Obstacles to Progress 
 
It is certainly an opportune time for scientists interested in human cognition to 
adopt a biological perspective, since the suite of tools available to support empiri-
cal inquiry into all aspects of biology have recently become so powerful. Human 
brain imaging techniques are now widely available, unthinkable a few decades 
ago, that allow us to examine neural function noninvasively, in normal subjects. 
After a decade or so of somewhat self-indulgent neo-phrenology, this field shows 
signs of maturing into a promising endeavor with important advantages over the 
patient-based approaches to neurolinguistics that preceded it. These tools will 
help map the functional circuits underlying language competence, and ultimately 
help point the way to the underlying neural computations that are of central 
interest. Behavioral techniques for investigating language and related cognitive 
functions, including eye tracking and looking time techniques, are unveiling a 
complex cognitive world in pre-verbal infants and non-verbal animals that 
stands in sharp contrast to their limited communicative ability. Finally, and 
perhaps most profoundly, the revolution in molecular genetics has produced 
genome sequences of humans, chimpanzees, dogs and many other species, and 
gene sequences of humans turn out to be nearly identical in many cases with 
homologous genes in chimps, mice, flies and even yeast. Genes involved in 
diverse aspects of human cognition are being pinpointed, and we can now both 
observe and control gene expression in animal models.  
 These and other new techniques are generating a flood of empirical data 
relevant to age-old questions about the development and evolution of language 
and the mind. These data often demand fundamental changes in entrenched 
ways of thinking about these problems. For instance, accumulating results and 
animal and infant cognition belie the belief that language is a pre-requisite for 
any form of complex conceptual processing. Similarly, the new results from 
developmental molecular genetics necessitate profound changes in traditional 
conceptions of ‘innateness’. Thus, more than ever before, the biological approach 
to language has much to offer the linguist, psychologist, anthropologist, and 
philosopher. Problems that once seemed insuperable, such as interactions 
between ontogeny, cultural ‘evolution’, and phylogeny, are slowly yielding to 
concerted theoretical and empirical effort (Deacon 1997, Kirby, Dowman & 
Griffiths 2007, Kirby, Smith & Brighton 2004, Steels 1999, Tomasello 2001).  
 But there is trouble in this potential interdisciplinary paradise, and despite 
considerable grounds for optimism, it is by no means certain that the new bio-
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linguistic approach will be as successful and productive as it deserves to be. As I 
see it, the problems facing a future science of biolinguistics come in two flavors. 
The first, and the less challenging intellectually, are essentially sociological 
problems concerning terminology, disciplinary turf wars, and struggles for domi-
nance. A reliance on oversimplified models and outmoded distinctions is another 
important sociological impediment to progress. Although these problems are 
easily diagnosed, they may be difficult to solve. Fortunately, some of the more 
deeply-entrenched and recalcitrant disciplinary divides and outmoded debates 
and dichotomies seem to be breaking down, and I am optimistic that the next 
generation of young biolinguists, for whom disciplinary boundaries are more 
fluid, will eventually leave many of these sociological problems behind. 
 The second class of problems involve far more profound theoretical diffi-
culties, and constitute some of the most serious intellectual challenges of our 
time, or indeed that science has ever faced. It is on these difficulties that I focus in 
this essay. I see three broad areas of conceptual challenge, each of them related to 
the others, and all three demanding fundamental theoretical and empirical pro-
gress before we can hope to understand the biological basis for language. The 
first challenge is neuroscientific: Despite huge progress, at a basic level we still do 
not understand how brains generate minds. This is as true of a dog’s brain as for 
a human’s, and it is true of very basic aspects of cognition, such as vision and 
motor control, along with language. The most fundamental neurolinguistic 
questions concern the basic computations underlying language use, and their 
specific neural basis. Current attempts to address this question remain on a shaky 
theoretical footing. The second challenge concerns genes and development: How 
do genes control the development of a single-celled zygote into the trillions of 
integrated cells comprising a complex behaving organism? Again, great progress 
has been made, and the new epigenetic paradigm allows us to reject long-
reigning models of the genome as blueprint. However, the complex and circular 
nature of epigenesis, and the resultant causal indirectness of development, still 
pose serious conceptual challenges. While we now understand in some detail 
how physical structures like the vertebrate limb develop, the principles under-
lying brain development and evolution remain only dimly understood.  
 Finally, while the neuro-computational and developmental difficulties are 
basically biological, and apply to any aspect of cognition, the last and I fear most 
profound difficulty concerns language more specifically. This suite of problems 
concerns questions of meaning. Put simply, we have a good theory of information 
(Shannon information theory), but we lack anything even approaching a good 
theory of meaning (what I intend with this information/meaning distinction will 
become clear below). Problems of reference, relevance and context-dependent 
interpretation remain central unresolved issues in the philosophy of mind. While 
the first two problems have matured to a stage where they appear to be accepted 
as problems of the empirical natural sciences, these last problems remain in the 
philosophical category. (We don’t even know how to devise experiments to help 
sort the issues out.) While these unsolved semiotic challenges pose problems for 
any aspect of cognition (what is it that happens when an organism interprets 
some stimulus as ‘meaningful’), they become particularly acute when discussing 
language, which is that aspect of cognition centrally concerned with meaning. 
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 Recent reviews of new approaches and data in biolinguistics are already 
available (Fitch 2005b, in press, and Johansson 2005). Therefore, my goal here will 
rather be to outline and clarify the problems facing the field. As one interested in 
seeing this field flower and grow, I intend my critical comments to be construct-
ive. I have been working in ‘biolinguistics’ (without knowing it) for the last 15 
years, since my decision as a young marine biologist to refocus my efforts on the 
evolution of language (e.g., Fitch 1994). Although I remain optimistic, I have 
become acutely aware of the difficulties facing the field, in part because successes 
in various areas have brought the remaining problems into sharper focus. 
Through my involvement in a recent interdisciplinary foray in biolinguistics 
(Hauser et al. 2002) and the debate that followed (Pinker & Jackendoff 2005, Fitch 
et al. 2005), I have also developed a healthy (if depressing) awareness of the socio-
logical problems that await attempts at interdisciplinary bridge-building. 
 In this article I will start by briefly discussing the sociological problems and 
disciplinary strife that arise from choices in terminology and differing con-
ceptions of ‘language’. These pose important but soluble problems for those with 
a bona fide interest in solutions, I think, and will not be my core focus here. In the 
main part of the article I will outline and clarify some of the deeper intellectual 
challenges facing biolinguistics, discussing why many currently-popular models 
and metaphors for understanding genes, brain and language need to be aban-
doned if we hope to make substantial progress. In some cases I will also try, 
tentatively, to sketch approaches to the problem that appear to me to offer pro-
mise. But I will be satisfied if the reader, accepting my critique of the ‘state of the 
art’, rejects my proposals for remediation. Each problem alone is extremely diffi-
cult, and combined as they must be in biolinguistics, even guessing at plausible 
answers is difficult. In this essay, as with any prolegomenon, my focus is making 
the problems sharp and clear, rather than defending particular solutions. 
 
2.1. Sociological Challenges: Disciplinary Discord and Terminological Debate 
 
The chance that the key ideas of any professional scholar’s work are pure nonsense is 
small; much greater the chance that a devastating refutation is based on a superficial 
reading or even a distorted one, subconsciously twisted by a desire to refute. 
(Langer 1962: ix) 
 
This wise insight accurately diagnoses much contemporary ‘debate’ in bio-
linguistics, particularly concerning the evolution of language. I know of no other 
field where scholars seem so ready to champion their own pet hypothesis un-
critically, while rejecting those of others as ludicrous. While I confess to finding 
some proposals in the literature uncompelling on first reading (e.g., the 
‘Throwing Madonna Hypothesis’ (Calvin 1983), or the ‘Aquatic Ape Hypothesis’ 
(Morgan 1997)), further reading and thought have convinced me that some valu-
able insights, and probably germs of truth, are to be found in such ideas — for 
one willing to put in the work of understanding them. Unfortunately, such 
willingness is too often in short supply, and debate in the biology and evolution 
of language frequently reduces to either misrepresentation (dismissals based on 
straw-man caricatures) or arid terminological debates (“I dislike the term X for 
some trait and propose term Y for the same thing”). Often the two are combined. 
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This syndrome is particularly true of criticisms of Noam Chomsky, whose ideas 
so many scholars apparently love to hate. In my opinion, once placed in context 
and properly understood, most of Chomsky’s scattered statements about both 
language evolution and its biological bases either are rather uncontroversial 
statements that any modern biologist studying, say, limb development would 
accept as a matter of course (e.g., that there must be various biological constraints 
upon the development of the language system), or statements of unpopular alter-
native hypotheses that deserve more careful consideration (e.g., language as a 
tool for thought rather than communication). Outside of his technical linguistics 
work, Chomsky’s main contribution to biolinguistics is his long championing a 
scientific approach to language as a biological phenomenon (Chomsky 2005). One 
will search in vain in Chomsky’s own writings for the naive conceptions of Uni-
versal Grammar for which he is so often mistakenly pilloried — one reason his 
critics typically quote his few scattered statements out of context, if they quote 
them at all.  
 My purpose in this article is neither to champion nor to attack Chomsky’s 
conception of language (for this, see, e.g., Jenkins 2000, Lieberman 2000, Jacken-
doff 2002, Boeckx 2010) — but rather to argue that such discussions too often 
miss or leave unmentioned deeper commonalities of viewpoint and approach 
shared by most contemporary theorists interested in the biology of language. In 
the next sections, I will try to look past the terminology at some uncontroversial 
facts about the biology of language, briefly discussing the terminological contro-
versies they have driven. My purpose is to shed the rhetoric and move into the 
conceptual heart of biolinguistics. This will set the stage for the main part of the 
article, where I discuss the core outstanding conceptual difficulties in detail. 
 
2.2. ‘The Human Capacity to Acquire Language’: The Core Explanandum 
 
The central research topic in biolinguistics is a characterization and explanation 
of the human capacity to acquire and use language. That this is an aspect of 
human biology is made clear by the everyday fact that any normal child raised in 
a human household will quickly, and apparently effortlessly, acquire the 
language(s) of its family and community, while no non-human animal will do the 
same. The pet dog or cat may learn quite a bit about the social and practical 
aspects of life in a human household, and often to recognize a few dozen spoken 
words of the local language, but its abilities to express its own thoughts using this 
language are little different from those of a potted plant in the living room. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, a chimpanzee raised in a human home will not 
spontaneously do much better: Even with long and intensive training, young 
apes learn to produce only an indistinct handful of inarticulate words (Yerkes & 
Yerkes 1929, C. Hayes 1951). Although use of the manual/visual modality via 
sign or symbols helps young apes considerably (Gardner & Gardner 1969, 
Premack 1971), the adult ape still cannot progress to anything like the level of a 
five-year old child, and its ‘linguistic’ utterances will be mostly confined to 
requests for tickles or treats. While not belittling the accomplishments or value of 
such experiments (cf. Savage–Rumbaugh 1986, Savage–Rumbaugh et al. 1993), it 
is important to acknowledge these limitations as well-replicated biological facts. 
W.T. Fitch 288 
 Clearly, immersion in a linguistic environment is not enough for spoken 
language to develop in most organisms. There must therefore be something about 
human children which differentiates them from other species, and this something 
provides one of our core explananda in biolinguistics. We might gloss this 
neutrally as ‘the human capacity to acquire language’. In generative linguistics 
this capacity is traditionally called the ‘Language Acquisition Device’, and a 
characterization of its properties termed ‘Universal Grammar’ (Chomsky 1965, 
reviving a 17th century term). Universal Grammar (before Chomsky) simply 
designated those aspects of human language competence which, because they are 
shared by all humans and all languages, went unmentioned in traditional 
grammars (Chomsky 1966, Allan 2007). For example, the notion that words exist 
and have specific meanings does not need to be specified in a grammar of French 
— it can be taken for granted. But this is precisely the sort of fact that does need to 
be explained by a successful biological approach to language. The original usage 
of the term made no particular claims about the nature of this competence (e.g., 
that it was specific to language, or conversely a general aspect of human 
cognition), nor did Chomsky’s revival of the term, which is quite neutral on such 
questions by my reading. However, both ‘Language Acquisition Device’ and, 
especially, ‘Universal Grammar’ arouse suspicion and rejection from scholars 
who nonetheless accept that such a human-specific biological capacity exists (e.g., 
Lieberman 1998a, Tomasello 1999, 2005). A huge amount of ink has been shed 
rejecting the term ‘Universal Grammar’, even by people who accept without 
question that a biologically-based capacity to acquire complex language fully is a 
uniquely-powerful birth-right of any normal human, but no known animal. The 
substantive debate concerns not the existence of such a human capacity for 
language acquisition, which is abundantly clear regardless of terminology, but 
rather its nature (e.g., the degree to which it is specific to language).  
 There remains, today, no widely-accepted term for this central aspect of 
human biology, despite the consensus about its existence. A recent attempt to 
break the resulting terminological logjam by introducing two new terms — the 
faculty of language in broad and narrow senses (FLB and FLN; Hauser et al. 2002) 
— unfortunately elicited similar reactions (e.g., by Pinker & Jackendoff 2005), 
although FLB was specifically and explicitly intended to capture a much broader 
and more inclusive conception of the language capacity than the one connoted by 
Language Acquisition Device or Universal Grammar. FLN was intended to have 
a considerably narrower scope, perhaps even denoting an empty set, but has 
been read simply as ‘language’ by some and ‘Universal Grammar’ by others. The 
term ‘language instinct’, popularized in Pinker (1994), has been rejected equally 
vehemently (e.g., Tomasello 1995). Frankly, it is unclear to me whether any 
acronym or shorthand version of the ‘human capacity to acquire language’ will 
escape a similar rhetorical assassination. Perhaps the field of biolinguistics will 
have to do without any such term for the time being (although I would person-
ally vote for ‘language acquisition capacity’ as a relatively neutral designation).  
 
2.3. ‘Innate Knowledge’ 
 
A similar terminological morass surrounds the term ‘innate’, and particularly the 
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concept of ‘innate knowledge’, although the problems here are at least partly 
substantive rather than terminological. The deep conceptual problem ultimately 
stems from the complexity of epigenesis (the complex interaction in the develop-
ing organism between developmental programs and the internal and external 
environment), to be discussed below. But the terminological problem hinges on 
what we are prepared (or inclined) to call ‘knowledge’. Knowledge is proto-
typically a representational state of adult minds, implemented somehow in their 
brains. We know enough today to say that this implementation will involve the 
morphology of individual neurons, their complex interconnections with other 
neurons, and the computational activities these neural circuits engage in. From 
this mechanistic perspective, it would be odd to ascribe ‘knowledge’ to genes, or 
to the just-fertilized egg. But what about the newborn infant’s ‘knowledge’ of 
language? Here we are on uncertain ground, for the child is certainly born with a 
brain, equipped with proclivities to attend preferentially to certain things (like 
human voices) and not others (like dog barks or engine noises). Even at birth the 
newborn already expresses preferences for its own mother’s voice, or her native 
language, or a lullaby she sang while the child was still in utero (Mills & 
Melhuish 1974, DeCasper & Fifer 1980, Mehler et al. 1988, Hepper 1991, Spence & 
Freeman 1996) — implying that the fetal environment has already shaped this 
newborn brain. This constitutes, perhaps, a kind of knowledge. In addition to 
such rapidly-acquired proclivities, the child manifests constraints on the type of 
regularities it extracts from linguistic input, and these constraints have been 
argued by many authors to be important or even necessary components of the 
child’s capacity to acquire language. Do such unconscious proclivities and con-
straints constitute ‘knowledge’? 
 
2.4. ‘An Instinct to Learn’ 
 
Light can be shed on this question by examining the analogous but better-
understood situation in birdsong learning, where an elegant and insightful 
model of a biologically-based cultural capacity has been developed by Peter 
Marler. Most songbirds (nearly half of roughly 9,000 bird species) learn their 
song: A young bird must hear exemplars of the song of its species in order to pro-
duce a normal song (Catchpole 1973, Marler & Slabbekoorn 2004). Birds raised in 
an aviary with other species, but without access to conspecific song, will sing 
either a completely abnormal song, or (in some cases) will learn the song of 
another species. Crucially, most birds do not simply mimic the song of adults 
exactly: In many species, individuals create new, novel songs that are built upon 
but not identical to the songs they heard as nestlings. This creative aspect of 
birdsong ensures that each generation hears slightly different songs from those of 
the previous generation. This process of song transmission across generations, 
with slight novelties introduced by creativity and or erroneous copying, leads to 
‘dialects’ of birdsong: Birds in different regions sing quite different learned 
songs. This cultural evolution process can quickly ‘repair’ song in a population 
experimentally seeded with aberrant song, correcting it toward the species-
typical norm (Fehér et al. 2009). But just as a human child of Chinese descent can 
learn perfect English, a young bird exposed to a different dialect than that of its 
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parents will master the new conspecific dialect.  
 Equally crucially, young birds exposed to the song of many different 
species will unerringly hone in on the song of their own species: A songbird ap-
pears to be born with a proclivity for the song ‘style’ of its own species, to which 
it will attend preferentially. So the bird’s propensity to learn is constrained in 
certain ways: It is not simply a ‘general purpose’ system that will learn anything 
it hears. These facts have forced students of birdsong to progress beyond simple-
minded nature/nurture dichotomies. Marler’s model of birdsong acquisition 
instead integrates both biological and ‘cultural’ factors, which are inextricably 
intertwined in an “instinct to learn” (Marler 1991). Songbirds, like human 
children, are born with a readiness to master their species-specific communication 
system, but they are not born knowing this system. Part of this biologically-given 
readiness is a proclivity to attend to certain types of auditory stimuli (conspecific 
voices and songs) and not others (dog barking, machine noises, etc). Constraints 
exist on what can and cannot be learned: There are limits on the sorts of artificial 
birdsongs a youngster can absorb. These facts show clear parallels with the facts 
of human language acquisition, and a model of the human cultural capacity as an 
‘instinct to learn’ is an important improvement over currently more popular 
metaphors. This conceptual model has recently been advanced explicitly to 
model the acquisition of human language (Doupe & Kuhl 1999, Marler 2000, 
Okanoya 2002, and Fitch, in press). 
 Returning, thus equipped, to the term ‘innate knowledge’, it seems to me 
somewhat misleading to refer to the constraints on the fledgling bird’s song 
acquisition system as ‘knowledge’. These constraints (whatever they might be) 
are not themselves knowledge but instead influence the knowledge the bird will 
someday possess. I would make the same terminological caveat, mutatis mutandis, 
about human language acquisition. However, many scholars are perfectly willing 
to term such innate constraints ‘knowledge’. I am happy to accommodate them, 
so long as the distinctions are kept clear between behaviors that are truly innate 
(e.g., the acoustic structure of human laughter or cry, and the inborn link 
between these sounds and pleasure or pain) and those, like speech sounds or 
birdsongs, for which an innate basis for acquisition exists, but where the 
behaviors themselves depend on structured environmental input to be acquired 
and expressed. This distinction illustrates why the term ‘language instinct’ is 
misleading. The prototypical cases of instinctual behaviors, such as mammalian 
crying or suckling, a chick’s escape from its shell, or a fly’s grooming, really are 
genetically-coded behaviors, fully-functional at birth. ‘Instinct’ properly 
characterizes the child’s acquisition system, but not the knowledge that system will 
eventually acquire. We are born with a language acquisition ‘instinct’ but not 
language per se. Again, the terminology is less important than the crucial under-
lying principle. What, precisely, is the nature of the capabilities, biases, pro-
clivities and constraints that the human child brings to the problem of language 
acquisition? 
 
2.5. Beyond Disciplinary Discord 
 
Whenever people vehemently reject a proposition, they do so not because it simply 
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does not recommend itself, but because it does, and yet its acceptance threatens to 
hamper their thinking in some important way.          (Langer 1942: 238) 
 
To summarize, the current literature on the biology of language reveals a 
somewhat depressing disciplinary landscape. Despite agreement about the 
central interest of the questions, and core explananda, and the promise of the 
diverse approaches and perspectives represented, members of competing 
factions too rarely cite each other or interact constructively. Theoretical discus-
sions are often dominated by rhetorical battles and ideological or terminological 
debate rather than constructive attempts to make tangible progress. Much of the 
criticism that currently divides the relevant fields boils down to “My opponent 
says we should look to x for answers, but I believe we should look to y instead”. 
Typically, both x and y are probably important. Given the large number of open 
questions, biolinguistics will be better off when individual researchers pursue 
those topics and approaches they believe are important and promising, and 
refrain from attacking others who have different interests or try different 
approaches. There is little to be gained from such attacks, and if my experience is 
any guide, much to be lost.  
 One can only hope that, whatever else happens, biolinguistics will shed 
unproductive rhetoric and get serious about making empirical progress. In 
addition to the stunning progress in contemporary biology, the grounds for opti-
mism within linguistics include increasing convergence among long-separated 
theoretical approaches to syntax (e.g., minimalism, tree adjoining grammar, con-
struction grammar, and functionalist approaches) towards heavily lexicalized 
theory of language, with a few basic and powerful operations (e.g., merge, adjoin 
or unify — see Joshi et al. 1991, Stabler 2004). Neighboring fields like neuro-
linguistics have proven willing to take insights from generative linguistics and 
test them empirically (Caplan 1987, Friederici et al. 2002, Arbib 2005, and Hagoort 
2005b), and biolinguistics as a whole will do well to follow this path. Interest in 
biological approaches to language seems to be growing rapidly in all disciplines, 
so those established scholars prepared to indulge in self-destructive turf wars 
should be equally prepared to watch the incoming neuroscientists and biologists 
take over the field. 
 
 
3. Beyond Evolutionarios: Testing Biolinguistic Hypotheses 
 
I consider it self-evident that the appropriate models for biolinguistics come from 
the natural sciences, such as physics in the early twentieth century, and cellular 
and molecular biology or neuroscience today. Theorists in these fields consider 
the issues, define their terms, and propose hypotheses that generate testable 
predictions. Experimentalists implement empirical research programs to test the 
predictions, based on widely accepted norms of good experimental design (e.g., 
explicit consideration of, and controls for, alternative hypotheses) and inferential 
statistics. The historical success of this ‘normal science’ approach hardly needs 
emphasizing: Our modern lifestyle from computers and cell phones to agri-
culture and medicine relies upon it, and the future holds, if anything, an 
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acceleration of progress in understanding the physical and biological world.  
 There is no reason that theorists and experimentalists should be different 
individuals, and I think at the present state of play most biolinguists need 
thorough familiarity with both theory and experiment. This is especially true for 
evolutionary questions, since generating testable predictions is far more difficult 
than coming up with untestable evolutionary scenarios. ‘Evolutionarios’ are 
entertaining but typically offer experimentalists little to work with. Despite the 
dearth of testable hypotheses, and surfeit of evolutionarios, in current discus-
sions, I think the situation is remediable. The onus is on theory-makers to gener-
ate clear definitions of terms and hypotheses, and practically testable hypotheses. 
Furthermore, progress will be aided by comparing and contrasting multiple 
hypotheses, not simply rejecting implausible null hypotheses in favor of single pet 
hypotheses. Ultimately, as for physics, what biolinguistics needs most are 
creative empirical tests of hypotheses. 
 Since Darwin, evolutionary biologists have been testing functional and 
phylogenetic hypotheses quite successfully, despite our lack of time machines, 
using the comparative method (Harvey & Pagel 1991). Although Language, writ 
large, is unique to our species, many (probably most) of the mechanisms involved 
in language have analogs or homologues in other animals (Hauser et al. 2002, 
Fitch 2005b), and their comparative study thus offers biolinguistics crucial in-
sights. Furthermore, new genetic techniques make it possible to roughly date the 
origins of mutations (e.g., Enard et al. 2002). A combination of a broad compara-
tive approach, molecular genetic techniques, and creative examination of indivi-
dual differences among humans offers many ways to test evolutionary hypo-
theses. For example, consider two venerable hypotheses about the origins of 
human speech. 
 Scholars have debated for centuries whether the lack of speech in other 
animals results from peripheral anatomy of the vocal tract (H1), or the nature and 
structure of the central nervous system (H2).  
 Recognizing that dolphins were mammals with large brains, Aristotle 
suggested that their lack of speech results from their lack of loose tongues and 
lips (Aristotle 350 BCE). Similarly, the discovery by Europeans of the (speechless) 
apes led to renewed consideration of the crucial capacities underlying speech, 
and anatomist Peter Camper concluded that the lack of speech in orangutans was 
caused by their large air sacs (Camper 1779). Both of these ideas are special cases 
of H1. Other scholars, like Darwin, considered these arguments, but sided with 
H2, that central neural factors must be critical: “The relation between the 
continued use of language and the development of the brain, has no doubt been 
far more important” (Darwin 1871). 
 
3.1. The Descended Larynx 
 
As a modern instantiation of H1, consider the descent of the human larynx (Fitch 
2000b). The lowered larynx and tongue root of humans was hypothesized by 
Philip Lieberman and colleagues (1969) to constitute an adaptation to produce a 
wider range of speech segments (particularly the point vowels, and the ‘super-
vowel’ /i/, used in vocal tract normalization). At that time, and for the next 20 
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years, both the descended larynx and vocal tract normalization were believed to 
be uniquely human (Lieberman 1984). In my PhD thesis (Fitch 1994), I developed 
a related hypothesis, based mainly on principles from physics and physiology, 
that human formant perception might build upon a capacity for size estimation 
predating speech, providing a pre-adaptation for the use of formants in speech 
(H3). This hypothesis required formants to be tied to body size, and clearly 
predicted that formant perception, and its use in size estimation, would be more 
widely present in other animals. Thus, it was based on a number of testable 
assumptions and made numerous testable predictions, and in the last 15 years 
my colleagues and I have been busy investigating them. We have found that, as 
predicted, formants provide a reliable cue to body size in many species, because 
body size, vocal tract length, and formant frequencies are inter-correlated (Fitch 
1997, 2000a, Reby & McComb 2003). Further, it predicts that listeners should use 
this potential source of information as an indicator of body size, as several 
species do (Fitch 1994, Reby et al. 2005, Smith et al. 2005, Ghazanfar et al. 2007). 
Finally, these finding spurred a closer look at non-human animal vocal pro-
duction, revealing a descended larynx (once believed uniquely human) in several 
non-human species (Fitch & Reby 2001, Weissengruber et al. 2002, Frey & Riede 
2003). 
 Most of the studies above were directly spurred by specific theoretical 
questions about the evolution of speech. Besides demonstrating that the descen-
ded larynx is not uniquely human, and suggesting that both formant perception 
and vocal tract normalization build upon primitive mammalian auditory mecha-
nisms, these data revealed that formant signals are an important component of 
vertebrate communication, are used to judge size, and that these ancient shared 
uses are still operative in modern humans. They provide abundant evidence 
consistent with H3, the pre-adaptive hypothesis of Fitch (1994), which thus 
becomes a serious contender as the original adaptive force driving the descended 
larynx in our species. Improved speech is no longer the only plausible 
evolutionary explanation for laryngeal descent, as previously assumed (Lieber-
man 1984), and it is possible that the descended larynx in adults evolved before 
spoken language. 
 Equally importantly, these and other recent data on vocal production in 
mammals demonstrate that the vocal tract is a highly flexible, reconfigurable 
system: Any mammal can lower its larynx dynamically (Fitch 2000c). Such data 
offer strong evidence against H1 in its strong forms. While our vocal tract 
certainly influences the types of sounds we can make, and has presumably been 
selected in human evolution for its beneficial effects on mechanical control and/ 
or the speed of information transmission (as argued by Lieberman 2006), peri-
pheral anatomy is not a crucial Rubicon that needed to be passed before humans 
could evolve spoken language. The descended larynx/tongue root is not the core 
factor keeping chimpanzees from speaking, and by process of elimination, that 
factor must rest in their brains, not their tongues. The comparative data indicate 
that neural factors, rather than peripheral anatomy, provide the core mechanistic 
basis for human speech capacities. What keeps chimpanzees from talking, but 
allows some seals to talk (Ralls et al. 1985) is the configuration of their brains, and 
not that of their tongues or vocal tracts. But while we have made tangible 
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progress by rejecting the peripheral vocal apparatus as the core factor underlying 
human speech, this research as yet offers little insight into which aspects of the 
central nervous system are different. Rejecting H1, we tentative accept the 
alternative hypothesis H2. 
 
3.2. Hypothesis 2: Into the Brain 
 
Any hypothesis based on the idea that it is increased neural control over vocal 
production that allows humans, and not other primates, to speak must posit 
some difference in neural circuitry that enables this increased control. Given the 
complexity of speech, and of motor control, there are likely to be several such dif-
ferences. One well-documented difference between humans and other primates 
is that our species possesses direct connections from lateral motor regions down to 
the motor neurons that drive the vocal apparatus, particularly the larynx and 
diaphragm (Iwatsubo et al. 1990, Jürgens 1994). By hypothesis, these connections 
allow increased voluntary control over the vocal organs, and better coordination 
between the facial and tongue musculature and phonation (which is crucial to 
human speech). Of course, although plausible, this ‘Kuypers/Jürgens’ hypothesis 
(H4) does not by itself prove anything: There are many small differences between 
a human and chimpanzee brain, and no guarantee that this one is critical to the 
known behavioral difference. How could H4 be tested? 
 The existence of other vertebrates with complex vocal learning open the 
door to an understanding of the mechanisms of vocal control, at both the neural 
and genetic levels. Although songbirds are by far the best understood group, 
mammalian vocal learners include cetaceans, seals (Janik & Slater 1997), bats 
(Knörnschild et al. 2009) and probably elephants (Poole et al. 2005). Unfortu-
nately, both birds and tractable cetaceans (e.g., dolphins) have a brain and vocal 
tract very different from that of humans. Nonetheless, the data from birds are 
consistent with H4: Birds have direct connections between the telencephalon and 
the primary motor neurons controlling their phonatory organ, the syrinx. While 
consistent, this is not perhaps as compelling as we would like. 
 Among mammals, both seals and bats use a normal mammalian brain to 
control a normal mammalian vocal tract, and thus provide a unique but mostly 
untapped source of information into the neural and genetic mechanisms under-
lying complex vocal control (particularly in phocid seals with complex learned 
‘song’ (Janik & Slater 1997, van Parijs 2003)). Currently, though, most questions 
one might ask about seal neuro-anatomy and vocal production have a simple 
answer: Nobody knows, because nobody has looked. The discovery of a species 
of fruit bats with complex vocal learning is so new that very little is known about 
neural control in this species (Knörnschild et al. 2009). So these are clear, open 
predictions of the hypothesis, waiting to be tested. 
 
3.3. Convergence, ‘Deep Homology’, and the Broad Comparative Method 
 
Although the significance of research on birds, bats, deer or seals is sometimes 
disregarded by those interested in human language because it does not concern 
primates, and thus does not reveal homologous mechanisms, this attitude misses 
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two crucial points about the comparative method. First, convergent evolution 
(e.g., of complex vocal imitation in humans, birds, seals and bats) allows us to test 
adaptive hypotheses. In convergent evolution, each clade that has evolved a trait 
constitutes an independent evolutionary data point. This is not true of a group of 
species that all inherit a homologous trait from their common ancestor: No 
matter how many species share it, such a trait constitutes a single data point. This 
is a fundamental insight of Darwin’s use of the comparative method, as well as 
modern statistics for evolutionary hypothesis testing (Felsenstein 1985, Harvey & 
Pagel 1991). 
 A second, more surprising, fact about convergent evolution is much more 
recent. It follows from a central realization in modern molecular biology 
concerning the profound conservation of genetic mechanisms across disparate living 
organisms. Genes involved in development turn out to be highly conserved 
(Gehring & Ikeo 1999, Carroll 2000). Even traits that have evolved convergently 
may often rely upon homologous genetic and developmental mechanisms (termed 
‘deep homology’ by Shubin et al. 1997). This discovery vastly broadens the scope 
of the comparative method, which has traditionally focused mainly on homology 
(though see Gould 1976). The new data pouring in from diverse distantly-related 
species (especially birds and rodents, but including pufferfish, flies, worms, 
yeast, and slime molds) reveals a stunning consistency in underlying genetic and 
developmental mechanisms in this diverse assemblage (Carroll et al. 2005). Such 
underlying conservatism of genetic details was unimaginable two decades ago. 
Even phenotypic traits that evolved convergently (and are thus homoplastic) 
often share common developmental and genotypic mechanisms. Therefore, a 
broad comparative approach that incorporates homoplasy in addition to super-
ficial homology has deep insights to offer. Biologists can avail themselves of a 
much broader range of species than previously thought, and confidently expect 
that much of the resulting data will be relevant to human traits (Carroll 2003, 
Carroll et al. 2005). For example, the discovery of mammals with a descended 
larynx opens the door to genetic and physiological research on the mechanisms 
underlying this trait. Widespread conservation of developmental mechanisms 
gives hope (though not certainty) that similar mechanisms may underlie laryn-
geal descent in humans and in species, like deer, amenable to experimental 
study. 
 This story is of course far from over: Replications remain scarce, and fur-
ther data are clearly needed. While a plausible case can now be made against H1, 
and for the pre-adaptive hypothesis H3, one might suppose that H3 never could 
be demonstrated, as these events occurred pre-historically but do not fossilize. 
Fortunately, this is not true: Comparative molecular biology offers a new and 
exciting path out of this apparent dead end. If we can uncover the molecular 
genetic basis for the descended larynx and for the complex vocal control 
underlying speech, we can use the techniques developed by molecular 
evolutionists (e.g., Enard et al. 2002) to date the selective events that established 
the corresponding alleles during human evolution. If the selective sweep leading 
to ‘laryngeal descent genes’ preceded that leading to ‘control genes’ (in quotes 
because it is unlikely that the alleles in question function exclusively in these 
domains), this would be strong evidence against Lieberman’s hypothesis that 
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speech preceded (and selected for) the descended larynx (and therefore in favor 
of the alternative). 
 In summary, the evolution of speech provides numerous evolutionary 
hypotheses that can be, and have been, tested. This leads us to a certain amount 
of optimisim about our ability to move beyond the domains of speech 
production, and resolve debates about core aspects of language: Syntax and 




4. Mind and Brain: The Need for Bridging Theories of Neural Computation 
 
Trying to understand perception by studying only neurons is like trying to under-
stand bird flight by studying only feathers.           (Marr 1982: 27) 
 
In his book Vision, a foundational work in cognitive science, David Marr argued 
that progress in understanding the visual brain requires research at multiple 
levels — including the implementational level (neurons and synapses), the algo-
rithmic strategy used to tackle the problem, and the computational-level 
description of the problem space itself (Marr 1982). He used Chomsky’s goal of 
formulating a computational model of language (what Chomsky termed a 
‘competence’ model), as an exemplar of this approach. While Marr’s multi-level 
approach has been embraced in the computational neuroscience of vision, its 
application to language remains relatively unarticulated (though see Poeppel & 
Embick 2005). I think this results at least partially from a failure in the cognitive 
sciences to fully embrace the insight that progress will require multiple, comple-
mentary levels of description, at the computational, algorithmic and implemen-
tational levels. Most crucially, we need bridging theories that go between levels of 
description, particularly the computational and algorithmic levels. 
 
4.1. Multiple Levels of Description 
 
Despite a long-running debate between connectionists and symbolists in cogni-
tive science (e.g., the many responses to Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988), a connectionist 
model at the implementational or algorithmic level is not necessarily in conflict 
with a symbolic computational model, but rather a potential complement to it, as 
clear thinkers in this debate have remained well aware. But accepting the need 
for multiple levels of description unfortunately doesn’t provide a road map for 
how to formulate models at each level, or how to link the levels. For that, lacking 
a general theory of neural computation, we must currently take a catch-as-catch-
can approach, using whatever clues we can find. The problem is particularly 
sharp given that our most powerful empirical tools at the neural level (e.g., 
single-unit recording or experimental gene regulation) are unavailable for the 
study of language because the species employed lack language, and the 
techniques cannot generally be applied to humans. At the highest computational 
level of language, our best guides must still come from behavioral studies, both 
psycholinguistics and traditional theoretical linguistics, with some help from 




 Comparative linguistics and typology are important additional elements, 
since the study of diverse languages can sharpen our focus on the problem by 
cataloging the diversity of solutions to it. In a few cases (e.g., metrical phonology 
and stress systems), linguists have already developed quite sophisticated models 
that seem capable of encompassing most of the diversity of the world’s languages 
(e.g., B. Hayes 1995): Both the required theoretical primitives (such as syllables, 
stress, feet, and prosodic words) and generalizations (e.g., the ‘iambic/trochaic 
law’), are relatively clear and uncontroversial. Such aspects of language seem 
ripe candidates for constructing algorithmic models incorporating psychological 
data (e.g., Cutler 1996) which can ultimately be translated to models of imple-
mentation. Unfortunately, however, such oases of clarity and agreement are the 
exception in linguistics. Consideration of the diversity of languages allows one to 
exclude certain possible theories (e.g., a theory that syntactic structure 
assignment relies necessarily on word order is falsified by ‘non-configurational’ 
languages like Warlpiri that have free word order; cf. Austin & Bresnan 1996). 
However, besides a general agreement on such theoretical primitives as words 
and sentences, and on the need for structure-dependent rules, there seem 
precious few specific theoretical claims that are beyond dispute in contemporary 
syntax or semantics. 
 
4.1.1. The Mechanistic Level 
 
Given that research and discussion at the purely computational level have so far 
failed to converge, perhaps there are lessons to be learned from considering the 
lower levels of description. A crucial lesson from computational neuroscience has 
been that progress typically results not from investigations at a single level of 
description, but by attempts to bridge between levels: It is the intersection of 
constraints from the different levels that gives us purchase on the problem (Rolls 
& Deco 2001). Our theory of color vision is informed by the understanding that 
there are three types of cones, and our theory of motion detection by the 
discovery of separate populations of cells interested in motion and not color. 
Similarly, consideration of neural data may help theoretical linguists ‘cleave 
nature at the joints’ in their attempts to discover robust and useful computational 
primitives in language. Current brain imaging techniques (fMRI, PET) provide 
little insight into the computation ⇔ algorithm linking problem. Knowing where 
brain activity increases in some language-related task (e.g., generating an 
inflected verb, or imitating a spoken word) provides pointers about where to 
look. Similarly, systems that provide high temporal resolution (EEG, MEG) can 
provide indications of when certain neural regions are activated, and thus 
provide better data for testing causal models of language processing. But both 
still leave open what the actual corresponding computation is: What aspect(s) of 
the circuit diagram are crucial.  
 
4.1.2. The Search for Computational Primitives 
 
Despite the value of brain imaging techniques, we cannot expect them to solve 
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the central problem. For that, we need to distill what we know from linguistic 
theory into a set of computational primitives, and try to link them with models 
and specific principles of neural computation. Unfortunately, appeal to general 
computational principles may be of limited value. To the extent that vision is best 
conceptualized as a ‘bag of tricks’, where each aspect of vision (color, motion, 
depth perception, etc) has its own unique solutions, there may be no general 
conclusions available about computations underlying ‘vision’ in general. The 
same may be true of ‘language’. However, vision is a far more ancient evolved 
system than language, so this lesson may not generalize, and certain classes of 
models seem to pop up consistently. Individual neurons are slow and sloppy, 
and sometimes die, and these basic facts have often led to the evolution of paral-
lel redundant circuits, rather than circuits that seem optimal to electrical 
engineers who have fast, precise and reliable computing elements available.  
 This difference between silicon and cell-based computers has led to abstract 
notions of ‘natural computation’ (Richards 1988, Ballard 1999) that may hold use-
ful clues for biolinguists building bridges between the algorithmic and compu-
tational levels. While a focus on just the computational level (‘competence’) 
remains a necessity in everyday work, consideration of ‘performance models’ 
(including both algorithmic psychological models and, implementational neural 
models) should ultimately inform our debates about ‘natural’ theoretical primi-
tives (Fitch 2005a, Hagoort 2005a, Friederici et al. 2006). Thus we need linguistic 
models that are explicit about the computational primitives (structures and 
operations) they require, and that attempt to define linguistic problems at a fine 
enough grain that one can discuss algorithmic and implementational approaches 
to their solution. We need a list of computations that linguistic theorists deem 
indispensable to solve their particular problem (e.g., in phonology, syntax, or 
semantics). 
 
4.2. A Tentative List of Computational Primitives  
 
A non-exhaustive smorgasbord of linguistic computational primitives, based on 
my reading of the linguistic literature, may help make my point, illustrating the 
sort of computational structures and operations that any model of language will 
need to incorporate. While different theorists might give rather different names 
to them (e.g., Jackendoff 2002), or object to my overly schematic descriptions, 
experts can hopefully read between the lines to see what I’m getting at. Alter-
natively, my list may spur the theoretically-inclined reader to generate their own, 
quite different, list of primitives. This list simply illustrates by example the sort 
breakdown needed to begin building bridges between computational theories, 
and the algorithmic and implementational levels. 
 
(1) Phonology and Syntax: Data structures including trees and related multi-
level structures are needed, as are structure-building algorithms that conca-
tenate constituents into tree structures, perhaps by forming temporary 
links among smaller structures stored in long-term memory (the ‘Lexicon’); 
evolutionary links with motor control seem likely. 
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(2) Phonology: ‘Natural classes’ of phonemes, such as stops or high vowels, 
are required because many phonological phenomena apply to specific 
classes (rather than specific isolated phonemes, or broader class such as 
vowels); evolutionarily, such natural classes may have built upon more 
general auditory categorization circuits. 
 
(3) Syntax (structure-dependent rules): Computations that apply to classes of 
structures (noun phrases or sentences) rather than specific words or broad 
types such as nouns. 
 
(4) Syntax and Semantics: Dependencies between words require the equivalent 
of variables or subscripts that can bind constituents into temporary 
linkages, such as article agreement, anaphora (binding pronouns to whole 
noun phrases, in the simplest case), or topic/comment markers in con-
nected discourse. 
 
(5) Semantics (thematic roles): Distinctions like agent vs. patient are necessary 
to distinguish the roles of multiple actors in such propositions as ‘John likes 
Mary’ vs. ‘Mary likes John’; although English does this mainly with word 
order, many languages have more flexible ways of marking and expressing 
this key semantic difference (e.g., case-marking). 
 
(6) Semantics: Complex conceptual structures, built up with embedders, con-
junctions, and disjunctions with scope, are needed and combining primi-
tive predicates into larger complexes, with possible attribution of an 
external referent, or truth or falsity, to the whole complex, is a crucial com-
putation in linguistic thought; despite considerable disagreement about 
whether this computational capacity is part of syntax, semantics or more 
general conceptual abilities, there is little disagreement about its basic 
necessity for both language and other aspects of complex thought. 
 
4.3. Examples of Bridging Constructs 
 
I will focus on the algorithmic ⇔ computational bridge in biolinguistics because 
we clearly have substantial work to do in attempting to build this specific set of 
bridges. The good news concerning the other, algorithmic ⇔ implementational 
bridge is that there is little evidence suggesting that language involves any major 
discontinuities from other aspects of cognition at low implementational levels. 
The neocortical circuits involved in language have the same layered arrangement 
as other non-language circuits, are connected with subcortical systems like thala-
mus, basal ganglia and cerebellum in the same ways, and use the same types of 
cells releasing the same neurotransmitters with the same kinds of action poten-
tials. The developmental processes by which these circuits arise follow the same 
basic principles as the circuits involved in vision or motor control in diverse 
mammals (Finlay & Darlington 1995). Whatever implementational details differ-
entiate language from other cognitive functions, they appear to be only rather 
subtly different from those underlying other aspects of cognition. Thus we can 
confidently expect that most aspects of language implementation will be based 
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on more general principles of brain development and function, and that good 
first-order approximations can be built upon shared principles of neural 
computation (Ballard 1999, Rolls & Deco 2001). We can also expect that such first-
try models will uncover some important differences in the details (otherwise, all 
brains, including those of other species, would be able to compute language 
readily), but these will not rely on wholly new neurophysiology or connectivity. 
For this reason, I see the algorithmic specification of the various components of 
language, based upon explicitly stated computational primitives and algorithm 
models, as a crucial missing link in our attempts to build the larger bridge 
between mind and brain. For a similar argument see (Poeppel & Embick 2005). 
 
4.3.1. Tree Networks and Algorithms over Trees 
 
To illustrate how a computational primitive might be fleshed out at the 
algorithmic and neural levels, consider the first computational primitive: Linking 
trees into larger complexes. First, because tree abstractions appear to be 
ubiquitous in theoretical models of cognitive phenomena (Simon 1962), not just 
language, research in other cognitive domains (e.g., chess playing, music 
perception, object recognition, or motor control) may offer insights into the 
nature of linguistic trees. Second, since words have a hierarchical internal 
structure (Kenstowicz 1994), and can be thought of as memorized chunks of 
structure, the processes by which words are learned, stored and recalled should 
have much in common with other aspects of long-term memory. Once recalled, 
such ‘treelets’ must be temporarily combined into larger structures via some 
process of binding (either adding a treelet’s root to the twig of the larger tree, and 
thus preserving tree structure topologically, or binding two twigs to create ‘tree 
networks’). This process may inherit aspects of the process whereby automatized 
motor subroutines are combined into temporary motor plans as we execute 
complex novel actions (e.g., Lieberman 1998b, Arbib 2005). In the same way that 
our ongoing plans are sometime interrupted and demand a reconfigured plan, 
the linguistic tree we have built during an ongoing parse may need to be aban-
doned and reconfigured (e.g., in garden path sentences). Thus, ‘performance’ 
theories about how linguistic trees are stored, recalled and recombined may 
profit from our pre-existing understanding of the neural basis of memory, motor 
control and other cognitive domains (as envisioned in Miller & Chomsky 1963). 
 At a more abstract level, such implementation-informed theoretical 
constructs could have important implications for how we formulate our overall 
theory. For instance, if we conceptualize language as a whole as a system that 
maps between high-dimensional conceptual structures (‘thoughts’) onto low-
dimensional signal structures (phonetically-realized speech or sign streams) it 
immediately becomes clear that this is an ill-posed problem in the technical sense 
that there can be no unique solution to the signal ⇒ concept expansion problem 
(due to the greater dimensionality of the target domain), nor perfect solution to 
the concept ⇒ signal compression problem (there being multiple candidate 
mappings, each omitting something). There can’t be enough data in the signal to 
allow perfect reconstruction of the original thought structure. Given this ill-posed 
problem, what is remarkable is that language works so well for communication, 
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and that (in general) we succeed at expressing our thoughts in words, and in 
reconstructing others’ thoughts from their words. The solution demands a 
massive quantity of shared world knowledge: Far more information is generated 
by ‘reading between the lines’ than is literally present in the signal. Pragmatic 
inference using shared world knowledge is a computational necessity (Sperber & 
Wilson 1986).  
 
4.3.2. Evaluating Optimality 
 
Syntacticians have long recognized that one aspect of the signal ⇔ meaning 
mapping process is an element of cyclicity in the application of syntactic rules 
(Miller & Chomsky 1963). Beyond a certain point of expansion, we become 
unable to deal with large structures and loose ends dangling: We must ‘close’ or 
complete old structures if we are to cope with new ones. The first question one 
can ask is why this effect occurs at all. One likely answer might be that memory 
limitations (‘performance constraints’) simply prevent us from what would 
otherwise be an optimal solution (in much the same way that many theorists 
agree that memory limitations prevent easy parsing of arbitrarily center-
embedded sentences). But an alternative answer is that the nature of the concept-
signal mapping problem makes cyclicity a computational necessity: Even an ideal 
model would include cyclic application of mapping rather than an ‘all-at-once’ 
compression. Both models are logically plausible, and adjudicating between them 
would require two idealized models with which to compare actual human 
performance. Contemporary computational linguistic parsers don’t provide such 
a model, because they assign syntactic structures, not conceptual structures, to 
strings. Indeed, mapping strings to concepts remains the major unsolved 
problem in computer language processing (see below). Thus, contemporary 
linguistics still lacks an ‘ideal communicator’ model comparable to ‘ideal 
observer’ models in vision, and only once we have such models can we decide 
whether actual human performance on this task is sadly sub-par, due to memory 
or processing limitations, or in fact are nearly optimal.  
 
 
5. Genes, Bodies and Brains: Biology Comes to Grips with Epigenesis 
 
Another core issue that faces biolinguistics, and biology in general, is develop-
ment. How can a single cell (the fertilized egg), with two copies of a few giga-
bytes of DNA, contain within itself the basis for a newborn’s body with 100 
trillion cells and a brain with a trillion synapses? How can 25,000 genes possibly 
possess enough information to specify this process? Alternatively, how could the 
environment in utero provide this information? How could evolution have 
encoded it? Where does all this information come from? 
 
5.1. Three Reductios of Naïve Models 
 
Let us first dispense with the obvious possible answers in a series of simple 
arguments, each a reductio ad absurdum of the corresponding oversimplistic 
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models, by considering the information available for pure nativist or empiricist 
models more closely. 
 
5.1.1. The Naïve Nativist Model 
 
The human brain is estimated to contain roughly 100 billion = 1011 cells, each of 
which has between 100 and 10,000 synapses, leading to at least 1014 synapses in 
the brain. To specify 1 of 1011 cells exactly, you need 37 bits. Therefore, to specify 
simply the connecting cell corresponding to each synapse you would need 37 x 
1014 bits (and to specify the synaptic weight you would need at least eight bits per 
synapse). There are about 3 billion (3 x 109) base pairs in mammalian genome, so 
even if the genome was fully dedicated to specifying brain structure (which it is 
not) and had perfect coding in an information-theoretic sense, we would have a 
shortfall of at least 5 orders of magnitude to specify the connections in a human 
brain: We have 1/10,000th of the DNA we would need to code the detailed wiring 
of our brains. This ‘gene shortage’ has led scholars like Paul Ehrlich to conclude 
that little of our behavior could possibly be innate (Ehrlich 2002). Let us therefore 
similarly consider an exclusive role for the environment.  
 
5.1.2. The Naïve Empiricist Model 
 
Let us optimistically suppose that we learn something from our environments 
every second, waking or asleep, of our lives. There are 31 million seconds in a 
year (3.15 x 107). If we live to 100, that’s just 3 x 109 seconds (roughly the number 
of base pairs in the genome). The first five years of life, when most language 
learning is occurring, contain only 15 x 107 seconds. Even the most fortunate and 
well-stimulated baby has this paltry number of environmental inputs available to 
specify 1014 synapses. Although we can hope that many synapses are influenced 
by each environmental input, this doesn’t help unless each input event, is very 
highly structured, carrying a large amount of optimally coded information. This 
seems optimistic, to say the least. Thus the naïve empiricist faces the same vast 
information shortfall as the naïve nativist. 
 
5.1.3. The Naïve Evolutionist Model 
 
Finally, for completeness, consider the plight of a different type of nativist: An 
idealized ‘evolutionary empiricist’ who suggests that natural selection alone has 
programmed behavior. Vertebrate evolution has occupied about a billion (109) 
years. If we optimistically hypothesize (e.g., Worden 1995) a few bits of 
information per generation to accumulate, that’s only a few billion bits again 
(and of course any particularities of the human brain have had far less time — 
roughly, 6 x 106
 
years — to accumulate). Again a vast information shortfall exists, 
of roughly the same order: This one a shortage of evolutionary time. 
 Are we to conclude from this little exercise that development is impossible? 
Or that the evolution of the brain could not have occurred? No, such basic 
considerations force us to reject overly simplistic models, and to conclude that 
both the naïve nativist (genome as blueprint) and naïve empiricist/evolutionist 
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(environment as instructor) viewpoints are woefully inadequate models. Such 
considerations quickly lead all serious thinkers on these problems to realize that 
understanding any aspect of development and evolution requires understanding 
the interactions between DNA and the world beyond the cell nucleus. Despite its 
tiresome persistence, ‘nature versus nurture’ is a sterile conceptual dead-end, and 
any valid answer must consider ‘nature via nurture’ in some form or other 
(Ridley 2003). 
 
5.2. Respect for the Cell 
 
An important new insight in our understanding of how genes build bodies and 
brains is the central role of cell biology in all aspects of development (Kirschner & 
Gerhart 1998, 2005). Crucially, the trillions of cells in our body break down into 
only 200-odd cell types, and there are only roughly 25 morphologically distinct 
cell types in the cerebral cortex. What the genome carries is not instructions for 
individual cells, but instructions for cell types. Furthermore, most of the basic 
behavior of these cells is shared among all cells in the body (as well as with free-
living single celled organisms like an amoeba or yeast), so something like half of 
our genome deals simply with basic cellular behavior, and only the differences 
from this ‘average’ cell need to be further specified (e.g., proteins like 
hemoglobin that are expressed only in blood cells). Each of the many trillion cells 
in our body is a semi-independent living thing: Under optimal tissue-culture 
conditions individual human cells can live for years on their own. This is not 
surprising when you consider that the first two billion years of evolution took 
place at the single-cell level. Since single-celled organisms have much shorter 
generation times than multicellular organisms, most of our ancestors were free-living 
single-celled organisms. From this long evolutionary history, each of our cells 
inherits some rather impressive behavioral capabilities. Each cell contains a 
complete copy of the DNA of the organism of which it is a part: It carries the 
entire ‘recipe book’ for the body along with it. Cells may make epic migrations 
through the body, following gradients of nutrients and responding to signals left 
behind by earlier pioneers, and each must eventually find a home and a job in 
order to survive. Individual cells are highly responsive and adaptable, and can 
deal successfully with evolutionarily novel circumstances (e.g., finding them-
selves in a damaged brain or mutant limb). 
 Once we recognize cells as active, adaptive, information-processing 
entities, we see that they form a crucial intervening level of explanation between 
the genetic and whole-organism levels. The apparent paradox of genetic and 
environmental information dissolves. Sewell Wright already recognized this in 
1931: “From the view that structure is never inherited as such, but merely types 
of adaptive cell behavior which lead to particular structures under particular 
conditions, the difficulty to a considerable extent disappears” (Wright 1931: 147). 
The technical details allowing us to flesh out this basic insight have only recently 
become clear. From a genetic viewpoint, much of the overall complexity of 
organisms arises through local interactions between cells and their immediate 
organism-internal environments: The genome doesn’t need to specify the shape 
of a human hand or a bats wing, but simply must constrain the overall pattern of 
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development of a mammalian limb, in a sense ‘sculpting’ a pre-existing develop-
mental archetype rather than building an iconic ‘blueprint’ of the final structure 
(Goodwin & Trainor 1983). As often correctly emphasized (e.g., Dawkins 1986, 
Ridley 2003), the genome is nothing like a blueprint. It is more like a recipe or 
program. Like any recipe, it leaves a lot of detail unspecified, and up to indivi-
dual cells’ ‘decisions’ based on their particular history and circumstances. From 
an evolutionary viewpoint, there is no need for natural selection to perform a 
detailed and complete hill-climbing process through a complex, mostly non-
adaptive morphogenetic space: It can let robust developmental processes do 
much of the work. Natural selection simply ‘chooses’ among the various 
relatively worse or better-formed, but still functional, options that result from 
development. This perspective on cells as prime movers in development and 
evolution is nicely described, with many examples, in (Kirschner & Gerhart 
2005), and many of the molecular developmental mechanisms explicated in 




Thus, in a way we are finally beginning to understand, recipes for building 
bodies are constrained both by the information in our genomes and the 
separately inherited cellular machinery acting on this information. Equally, 
development is constrained and informed by the environment, and has been 
shaped by evolution to respond robustly to it. Despite the apparent shortfall of 
information in any one of the relevant domains, the reality of epigenesis — the 
close interaction between information in the developmental ‘program’ and infor-
mation stored in the environment — is that such interaction is fully adequate to 
specify bodies along with brains and behavior as special cases (Gottlieb 1992). 
Environmental stimulation, and even social interactions, turn genes on and off, 
and development occurs via successive waves of interactions among cells, and 
between cells and their local environments within the body (themselves 
structured by previous such interactions). Crucially, the relevant ‘environmental 
information’ in epigenetic interaction is mostly the local environment surrounding 
each cell, and not that in organism-external world. This local environment has 
traditionally been left out of both nativist and empiricist models, but is clearly 
where the action is in development, filling in the information shortfall described 
above. 
 Each of the trillion cells in our body or the billion cells in our brain has its 
own, rather myopic, local environment which informs its DNA regulation and 
thus developmental decisions. Each second of development, different local 
environments are separately effecting each cell in our body in parallel. While this 
local internal environment is, for the most part, dependent upon past decisions 
made by neighboring and predecessor cells, it is also often influenced in 
important ways by the organism-external environment. This influence is perhaps 
most marked in the brain (which is the organ most specialized to process 
organism-external information), but other systems like the immune system have 
a similarly rich external-responsiveness. 
 Epigenetic, interactive developmental models are nothing new: The 
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concept has been standard in embryology for many years (Waddington 1957). 
Experimental embryologists like Spemann recognized that cells respond to 
messages generated by other cells, and that this determines their fate later in 
development. Huge advances in our understanding of the genetic basis of 
development in the last decades have brought such ideas to fruition, and now the 
molecular basis of Spemann’s ‘organizer’ signal, and many other similar cell-cell 
signaling systems, is becoming clear (see Gilbert 2003). The mechanisms by 
which DNA expression is regulated, both in classic epigenesis via transcription 
factors (proteins that bind to DNA), and longer-term changes (e.g., the new 
epigenetics of ‘genetic imprinting’ that can span generations) are now becoming 
clear (Reik 2007). This progress in turn has led to the construction of new bridges 
between evolution and development — evolutionary developmental biology or ‘evo-
devo’ — which promise to finally close the most crucial remaining gap in our 
understanding of biology (for authoritative introductions see Carroll 2005, 
Carroll et al. 2005). Today’s biolinguists can help themselves to some well-
developed models of epigenesis, and how development interacts with evolution, 
before trying their hand at understanding the epigenesis of language. For further 
implications of this perspective on the evolution of mind see Fitch (2008). 
 
5.4. Neurons: A Very Special Cell Class 
 
This cell-based epigenetic perspective, a central tenet of the evo–devo revolution, 
is as applicable to the development of brains as to the rest of the body. However, 
neurons are unusual in a number of ways. The most important is that they are 
specialized for information processing by networks of neurons, over and above 
the normal cell-cell interactions that influence all cells. In the case of a neuron in 
the developing brain, ‘finding a job’ means taking part in a circuit that behaves 
coherently, and many of the neurons that are born fail to achieve this goal, and 
undergo programmed cell death as a result. While the primary constraints on a 
skeletal cell in a developing bone are physical forces (stresses and strains), for a 
neuron the relevant forces are the complex ebbs and flows of an ‘information 
economy’ established by myriad surrounding cells (both neurons and glia) as 
well as quite distant neurons influencing it through their axonal projections. Thus 
the local environment of the brain is unusual both in the type of commodity 
processed (information) and the topology of interactions (including precise long-
distance connections, made possible by the unusually elongated neuronal 
morphology). While there is every reason to believe that insights from the 
development of limbs or the lung will carry over to the brain, we can also be 
certain that new principles are involved in brain development and evolution 
(Striedter 2004).  
 
5.5. The Way Forward 
 
One of the principal objects of theoretical research in any department of knowledge 
is to find the point of view from which the subject appears in its greatest simplicity.  
(J. Willard Gibbs) 
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The revolution underway in developmental biology has important implications 
for biolinguistics. Anyone interested in understanding the biological basis for 
human language acquisition must be prepared to jettison simplistic debates 
about nature vs. nurture, and unhelpful notions of heritability from old-school 
genetics (“Dyslexia has a heritability of 45%”). Instead we can expect highly 
complex interactions between cells of different types, and in different brain 
regions, to provide the link between genetic changes and individual phenotypes. 
We can expect few if any cellular behaviours or cell signaling molecules that are 
qualitatively novel, either to our species or to language (Hill & Walsh 2005), but 
instead seek combinations of conserved cell processes building neural circuits 
that perform qualitatively novel classes of computation (Szathmáry 2001). We 
can expect that such circuits, built of ‘normal’ neurons using standard 
neurotransmitters, will exhibit properties and connections that are ‘standard’ in 
the mammalian brain (e.g., cortico-thalamic loops), but that these same circuits 
may show patterns of connectivity that are unusual, and perhaps in some cases 
unique, to our species or to language itself. 
 It would be hard to overstate the difficulties we face in discovering such 
subtle implementational differences. Despite a long history of trying (e.g., 
Braitenberg 1977), even circuits whose structure is already known in detail (e.g., 
in the hippocampus or cerebellum) have proved remarkably resistant to abstract 
computational analysis. Although a variety of simple models of memory or 
motor control exist, computational neuroscientists have yet to converge on 
models that are adequately comprehensive yet simple enough to understand. 
And these systems are broadly shared with well-studied ‘model’ animal species 
(mice, rats, monkeys, etc). 
 Integrating our computational and developmental problems, we can expect 
that any simple developmental model of the key neural computations involved 
language will be incorrect in its details. Nonetheless, progress will be fastest if we 
attempt to develop explicit simple models of various language mechanisms, 
amenable to experimental disproof, and then let the data show us where they are 
wrong. In the same way that Galileo and Newton achieved huge gains in physics 
by abstracting away from the existence of friction, we may expect that abstract 
models of neurolinguistic function and development, based on known aspects of 
neurophysiology and neural development but tailored to the specific 
computational needs of language, will offer hope of rapid progress. Progress 
requires posing simple (perhaps over-simplified) models, knowing they will be 
wrong, and letting the data tell us where they are wrong. As Einstein advised, 
“everything should be as simple as possible, but not simpler”, and falsifiable, 
simple models will be vastly preferable to complex, unfalsifiable models with too 
many unconstrained variables. 
 
 
6. Information and Meaning: The Final Frontier 
 
I will end with a brief look at the aspect of language that I think promises to be 
most difficult to solve: The problem of meaning. While we have a powerful and 
well-understood theory of information, we still lack a mathematical theory of 
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meaning, and developing such a theory poses some knotty conceptual and 
computational problems. Here, more than anywhere else in this article, I attempt 
only to point out the problems, without offering even sketches of solutions. I 
think the magnitude of the problem often (or even typically) goes unnoticed in 
linguistics, where theorists tend to rely on an already-linguistic conception of 
semantics (a ‘language of thought’ of some sort) without focusing on the far 
deeper difficulties for modeling non-linguistic concepts (cf. Millikan 1987). The 
last thirty years of animal cognition research leaves little doubt that non-
linguistic animals have complex concepts and can reason with these, and in 
general can have rich, active mental lives — despite their inability to express their 
thoughts to others (Vauclair 1996, Hauser 2000, Griffin 2001, Hurford 2007). 
These cognitive systems predated language, and form the cognitive foundation 
for word and sentence meanings today. Thus the problems involved in 
developing an adequate theory of meaning are very broad, and extend far 
beyond the confines of language or linguistics. Indeed many of the problems 
have been recognized most clearly in artificial intelligence and robotics, where 
attempts to build computers that can execute simple but novel motor acts, 
recognize objects, or recognize basic referents and thus implement even the 
roughest approximation to ‘meaning’ have thus far been relative failures. Some 
of the key missing ingredients of a rich cognitive theory of meaning include a 
sub-theory of context, and a theory of relevance. 
 
6.1. Shannon Information as a Foundation 
 
Claude Shannon’s formalization of ‘information’ as a quantifiable mathematical 
entity was a bold, unifying theoretical move, recognized as revolutionary almost 
immediately upon its publication (Shannon & Weaver 1949). The success of 
information theory in the domain of technology would be hard to overstate: This 
formalization was the basis for all subsequent work on digital representation and 
communication theory, without which today’s digital world would be unthink-
able, where virtually all communicated material (text, speech, music, images, 
video and other data) is rendered as a pattern of bits. Shannon’s paper 
introduced the very term ‘bit’ and the underlying conceptual framework of the 
digital revolution. Shannon’s ‘information’ was also recognized as deeply 
interesting theoretically, because its intimate formal connection with the physical 
concept of entropy offers a link between the inanimate world of particles and 
probabilities, and the biologically critical worlds of information and meaning. 
However, Shannon and co-inventor Norbert Wiener both clearly recognized that 
the revolution they sparked was only partial, because ‘information’ in this 
formalization is far from identical with information as normally understood. In 
particular, Shannon and his popularizer Weaver were both explicit in 1949 that 
Shannon information fails to incorporate any notion of the meaning of a signal. 
This limitation leads to some non-intuitive propositions in information theory 
(e.g., that the ‘information’ in white noise is greater than that in a symphony or 
speech). Despite Shannon’s own clarity on the limitations of ‘information’ in his 
sense, this caveat has been largely ignored on two important fronts. From a 
practical viewpoint the distinction between meaning and information has 
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become blurred (e.g., in engineering), and from a theoretical viewpoint 
Shannon’s call for an extension of his concepts into the domain of true, 
biologically-relevant meaning has gone unanswered (e.g., in cognitive science or 
neuroscience). 
 Although its incompleteness has periodically led to a call to abandon 
Shannon information theory entirely (e.g., King 2004), this would be unwise 
given the manifest success of this theory in all domains to which it has been 
earnestly applied (both technology and neuroscience), along with the steady 
improvements in the theory (MacKay 2003). Thus, I think the goal for an eventual 
theory of meaning should be to build upon Shannon’s formalism, incorporating 
his theorems and extending them. I suggest that two key desiderata for such an 
extended theory of information, incorporating meaning, are formalizations of 
context and of relevance. 
 
6.2. Context and Relevance — ‘One Man’s Signal is Another Man’s Noise’ 
 
The same signal may be meaningful in one context and meaningless, or 
meaningful but irrelevant, in another. At several levels this context-dependence 
is captured by the phrase quoted above. Meaning must be defined relative to 
some context: A broad temporal-spatial window of data, both organism-internal 
and -external, much larger than the signal whose information is to be interpreted. 
This context, provides the data relative to which the meaning of any signal is 
interpreted. A signal (e.g., white noise) may have a meaning of 0, despite its 
information-rich high bit rate. This distinction may help to resolve the non-
intuitive nature of Shannon information: A signal could have high information 
and low meaning, or lower information (e.g., speech or music, which are quite 
redundant) and high meaning. Relevance, a basic quantity in any adequate formal 
theory of pragmatics (Sperber & Wilson 1986), depends not just on current 
external context, but also on an individual’s current cognitive state: Drives, goals, 
unanswered questions, hypotheses being processed. Relevance is thus in the eye 
of the beholder, and demands a formalization of external context and goal-
directed internal context. 
 We should in principle be able to define ideal observer (‘ideal interpreter’) 
models that can extract all the possible connections between all possible signals 
for a given world and goal context. Unfortunately, the well-known combinatorial 
explosion that results poses serious obstacles to using such models to control 
action, because a set of computations subject to unconstrained combinatorial 
explosion is of little use in real-time computation of meaning. This is the 
infamous ‘frame problem’ in artificial intelligence (Ford & Pylyshyn 1996), and 
the ‘solutions’ to the frame problem currently on offer in AI all essentially 
involve a priori limits on the extent of this explosion: All variants of what Simon 
long ago dubbed ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1957), or of Chomsky’s innate 
biases. However, it is unclear that such bounded models can do justice to the 
seemingly unfettered connection-finding revealed by individual human 
linguistic creativity, or of the social ramifications of this creativity, as seen both in 
culture and science. While discussions of the frame problem in technology have 
grown less central as various work-arounds have been developed, the central 
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epistemological issue in understanding the mind is not solved, or even obviously 
confronted, by such ‘solutions’ (for discussion see Fodor 2000: Chap. 2). Further, 
no ideal interpreter model alone can capture the relevance of a signal without an 
additional specification of goals, problem states, current behavioural sequence, 
current location, etc. There is a considerable amount of explicit computational 
theory still missing here. 
 
6.3. The Future: Comparative Cognition Meets Formal Semantics? 
 
Given the problems context-dependent combinatorial explosion causes for 
contemporary computers and robots, the remarkable fact is that organisms seem 
to rarely suffer from the frame problem. Indeed, simple motor tasks that seem 
trivial to us (or to a monkey or a dog) — locomoting around obstacles, 
negotiating novel paths successfully, or picking up objects without breaking 
them — remain daunting for today’s robots. At the level of perception, 
perceptual ‘mistakes’ like illusions are the exception and not the rule, and we 
seem quite effortlessly to exclude a huge variety of possible interpretations, 
converging reliably on a relatively accurate but extremely flexible model of the 
world — again a trick that evades today’s best machines and algorithms. In 
computational linguistics, even simple sentences generate hundreds of possible 
parses — but we humans rarely even consider more than one of them. One thing 
that seems common to many of these feats is our ability to use context of various 
sorts to prune away all but the most probable branches of the tree of possibilities. 
Our ability to evaluate the relevance of various possible interpretations builds on 
this more basic context-dependence to explore models of the future or possible 
worlds. Almost all of this computational generation and pruning is unconscious 
(perhaps necessarily so, as I have argued in Fitch 2005a, 2008). Furthermore, most 
of these processing capabilities must have predated the evolution of language, 
since effortless incorporation of context in decisions of relevance typifies the 
behavior of a dog or chimpanzee as much as a human. Thus, in some sense, the 
conceptual and neural basis of ‘meaning’ is a more basic problem than, and its 
solution should be logically prior to, an understanding of semantics in natural 
language. Thus, unfortunately, a general theory of ‘meaning’ ultimately demands 
a complete theory of how brains make minds, clearly one of the hardest problems 
left for science to solve. Ultimately, I believe that new theoretical tools will be 
necessary to understand meaning in the more general non-linguistic sense I have 
been discussing, and that the study and modeling of non-linguistic animal 
cognition will play a crucial role in such an enterprise. For now, an attack on the 
problem from multiple (hopefully someday converging) perspectives will be 
required. 
 Linguistics, in the guise of formal semantics, potentially has something to 
offer this enterprise. Contemporary semanticists have developed a rather power-
ful set of theories and formalisms, with truth-value, possible word, and model-
theoretic semantics among the prominent theoretical approaches, and a variety of 
formalisms based upon propositional and predicate calculus and their extensions 
(Portner 2005). Such approaches are unlikely to solve some of the deeper 
problems of an embodied (organism-dependent) and context-dependent theory 
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of meaning, precisely because they intentionally abstract away from such 
problems (see e.g., Montague 1974). Nonetheless, the tools provided by formal 
semantics should play an important role in our final understanding of linguistic 
semantics by providing rigorous definitions of the sorts of problems that must be 
solved (e.g., logical entailment or scope of quantifiers). Contemporary semantics 
appears largely to take for granted the existence of non-linguistic models of the 
world (though work on spatial language provides a welcome, if narrowly 
circumscribed exception: Landau & Gleitman 1985, Landau & Jackendoff 1993). 
But real progress in understanding this extra-linguistic context- and relevance-
sensitive domain of basic cognition will require considerably more work in this 
direction, (cf. Jackendoff 2002). Until a well-developed, mathematically-
formalized cognitive theory of meaning, applicable to animal cognition and 
including basic reference and context-dependent relevance, is available, any 
biologically-based theory of language will remain incomplete. 
 
 
7. Conclusions and Some Outstanding Biolinguistic Questions, Framed as 
Testable Hypotheses 
 
With these prolegomena, I have tried to clarify some core problems that face the 
new science of biolinguistics. The sociological problems discussed at the outset 
should be soluble with good-will, mutual respect, and self-imposed restraint. 
Sober biolinguists will recognize that the core problems facing this field are far 
too big for any one individual to solve on their own (if only because mastery of 
all the relevant disciplines is impossible for even the most gifted polymath), and 
will team up to solve them together. I am thus guardedly optimistic that the 
fascination of the questions and exciting promise of new techniques and 
approaches will sweep away many traditional barriers to success. 
 In contrast, the three problem areas that form the heart of this article pose 
serious scientific challenges. Each is daunting in its own right. When these 
challenges are combined, it becomes clear that developing a biological 
understanding of human language is one of, if not the, most difficult problems in 
all of contemporary science. Although I have tried where possible to indicate 
possible solutions to at least some aspects of the problems discussed, my primary 
motivation in this article was simply to clarify the problems themselves. I think 
that all researchers interested in biolinguistics can profit from musing over these 
difficulties, and trying to clarify their nature. At the very least, a meditation on 
the gravity and breadth of these problems can induce a humility about one’s own 
attempts at solutions, perhaps contributing somewhat towards remediation of 
the sociological problems that hinder the field. But in any case, a clear 
understanding and statement of unsolved problems is the best spur to their 
solution. 
 I emphasized above that the model for progress in biolinguistics will be 
empirical testing of theoretical predictions, along the lines of physics or 
molecular biology. Thus I end this article by taking a dose of my own proposed 
medicine, recapping one testable hypothesis and presenting six more, spanning 
the range of the problem spaces discussed in this article. Hypothesis (A) below is 
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recapped from section 3, as a reminder of the type of multifaceted research 
program that we will need to find answers to any of these questions. I imagine 
key contributions by researchers in disciplines as diverse as field and laboratory 
ethology, theoretical, comparative and historical linguistics, developmental 
biology and psychology, molecular genetics, experimental psychology, 
computational linguistics, comparative neuroanatomy, sociology and brain 
imaging. I will make no attempt to flesh out the theoretical underpinnings of 
these hypotheses, or to detail the experiments that would be involved in testing 
them. These are left as an exercise to the reader, as a prolegomenon is best 
summed up with questions, rather than answers. While these questions don’t 
begin to exhaust the list of testable hypotheses in biolinguistics, I hope they give 
some sense of the potential interest, breadth and promise of this nascent field, 
and illustrate the future need for broad and productive interdisciplinary 
collaboration.  
 
(A) Speech Followed Laryngeal Descent  
If size exaggeration was a pre-adaptation for speech (Fitch 2002), human 
genes controlling male pubertal laryngeal descent should have fixated 
before those involved in complex vocal control (Hypothesis H3, section 3 
above). 
 
(B) Speech Entails Babbling  
If ‘closing the loop’ between production and perception is a prerequisite for 
complex vocal learning, all vocal learning species should normally babble 
(show an early stage of autostimulatory vocal play, e.g., sub-song in birds; 
Fitch 2006a, 2006b); untested species include pinnipeds, bats, cetaceans. 
 
(C) Signal Imitation  
If vocal and visuomanual imitation both reflect an abstract domain-general 
capacity for ‘mimesis’ (Donald 1991), auditory and visual imitation abilities 
in individual humans should be closely correlated; if they reflect indepen-
dent, separately-evolved mechanisms there should be no such correlation. 
 
(D) Syntactic Power  
If human sentence-parsing capacities indeed occupy the mildly-context 
sensitive level of the formal language hierarchy (Joshi et al. 1991, Stabler 
2004), the additional form of memory involved in processing grammars 
beyond the finite-state level should have the characteristics of a queue, 
rather than a stack. 
 
(E) Language Acquisition  
If human language acquisition is just a special case of a general innate 
capacity for acquiring culture (Tomasello 1999), then individual children’s 
progress in acquiring language should be closely correlated, both tempo-
rally and across individuals, with their progress in other aspects of sociali-
zation and mastery of non-linguistic culture (cf. Markson & Bloom 1997). 
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(F) Semantics and Neuronal Arborization  
If natural language has cognitive access to conceptual mechanisms that are 
encapsulated in other species (e.g., chimpanzees), populations or subclasses 
of neurons with broadened dendritic or axonal arbors should quantitative-
ly distinguish our brains from a chimpanzee brain, and these arbors should 
be widely distributed throughout the brain rather than restricted to 
traditional ‘language’ areas (cf. Enard et al. 2009). 
 
(G)  Plasticity of ‘Critical Periods’  
If epigenetic interaction between genes and external environment plays a 
key role in developing the neural circuits underlying language (Bates 1999), 
‘sensitive periods’ (Lenneberg 1967) during which such interactions are 
possible should be plastic; in particular, some classes of extreme environ-
mental change (e.g., adoption) should be capable of ‘resetting’ the language 
acquisition system in young enough children, with a concomitant change in 
gene expression patterns in the child’s brain — this should not be true of 
epigenetic processes dependent only on the early-developing organism-
internal environment. 
 
 One could easily generate many more such hypotheses. The difficulties lie 
not in hypothesis generation but in developing empirical research programmes 
to test such ideas. If the current essay helps current and future workers in this 
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